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AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE: EXPERIMENTAL
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We present results of a randomized evaluation that assesses the effects of different incentives for dif-
fusion of agricultural knowledge by smallholders in northern Uganda. Randomly-selected dissemi-
nating farmers (DFs) from a large sample of villages are assigned to one of three experimental arms:
(a) training about climate smart agriculture, (b) training plus a material reward for knowledge diffu-
sion, and (c) training plus a reputational gain for knowledge diffusion. We find that leveraging some-
body’s reputation (or social recognition) has a positive impact on DFs’ experimentation and
diffusion effort. This impact is stronger than that measured in the private material rewards
treatment.
Key words: Incentives, pro-social behavior, social learning, technology transfer, climate smart
agriculture.
JEL codes: H5, O13, O33, Q12.
Transforming smallholder agriculture in or-
der to lift the majority of the population in
sub-Saharan Africa out of poverty requires
boosting agricultural productivity under in-
creasingly volatile conditions. This requires
diffusion of modern technologies (e.g.,
Evenson and Gollin 2003; Minten and
Barrett 2008), but in many African countries
adoption rates of innovations remain low
(Pamuk, Bulte, and Adekunle 2014). Several
well-known reasons help to explain this.
Benefits may be heterogeneous, reflecting va-
riety in growing conditions and other factors,
so adoption may be unprofitable for some
smallholders (e.g., Suri 2011; Magnan et al.
2015). Costs associated with innovations such
as improved seeds or fertilizer may be an im-
pediment to adoption if capital markets are
imperfect. The low quality of agricultural
inputs may help explain low take up (Bold
et al. 2017), as does a lack of information
about the existence and proper implementa-
tion of agricultural innovations (e.g., Foster
and Rosenzweig 1995).
In this paper we focus on the diffusion of
information. Development organizations and
policy makers have long believed that infor-
mation “travels easily” within social net-
works. Interventions reaching small target
groups are expected to reach much larger
populations as information diffuses from
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“treated individuals” to their peers.
Interventions based on the assumption of au-
tomatic and extensive spreading of informa-
tion, such as traditional extension efforts,
have by and large produced unsatisfactory
results and failed to reach large parts of the
intended population (de Janvry, Sadoulet,
and Rao 2016). In some countries, such as
Uganda, disappointing outcomes have led to
the disbandment of national agricultural ad-
visory services systems. Current efforts to
strengthen national extension systems in de-
veloping countries recognize the need to
search for cost-effective complementary
actions (Godtland et al. 2004).
Recent evidence suggests that knowledge
does not diffuse automatically. Diffusion of
information requires time and effort of
agents on both the “supply” and the
“demand” side. Allocation of effort to teach-
ing and learning is akin to an investment by
smallholders, so it makes sense for develop-
ment agents to consider complementary
measures to facilitate such investments.
There are several dimensions to this issue.
The first one is who to select as the
“disseminating farmer (DF)”—the first indi-
vidual in the target population to receive the
technology (Banerjee et al. 2013, 2019). Not
all individuals are equally likely to reach
large numbers of co-villagers, or be in a posi-
tion to convince others to follow their behav-
ior. Traditionally, extension efforts targeted
better-off farmers, who typically are well-
connected and expected to be role models for
their peers. However, since such farmers may
not be representative of their co-villagers,
their experiences may be of limited value to
others (e.g., Munshi 2004; Conley and Udry
2010; BenYishay and Mobarak 2018).
Although it is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent study to identify optimal DFs or map the
network structure, recent literature focuses
on exploiting (social) network theory, and
proposes targeting individuals who occupy ei-
ther a central (e.g., Kim et al. 2015) or clus-
tered position in the network (Chami et al.
2018; Beaman et al. 2018). In our study, we
select as DF a farmer who is comparable to
his or her fellow villagers in terms of wealth
and education.
A second dimension—which is the focus of
our study—concerns how to motivate DFs to
inform their peers and encourage them to
adopt the technology (BenYishay and
Mobarak 2018). Following Benabou and
Tirole (2006), we distinguish between three
motives for why farmers may invest time and
effort in educating their peers. First, they
may be altruistic and intrinsically motivated
to help their co-villagers. Second, they may
gain status and social recognition by helping
others. Finally, they may engage in diffusion
if there are private tangible rewards associ-
ated with knowledge diffusion. This could
happen if there are externalities in adoption
or the use of new technologies (e.g., pest
management), or if external rewards for dif-
fusion are introduced. BenYishay and
Mobarak (2018) demonstrated that incentiv-
izing DFs via material rewards was an effec-
tive approach for promoting diffusion.1
These authors trained DFs in Malawi to use
new technologies (pit planting and compost-
ing), and promised some of them a bag of
seeds in the event that knowledge and adop-
tion of new technologies increased suffi-
ciently among other farmers. They find that
only with the incentive, DFs experiment
with and communicate about the technolo-
gies, leading to increased adoption among
other farmers. These findings underscore
the importance of understanding the
motives for farmers to spread information to
others.
The objectives of this paper are twofold.
First, we use an experimental approach to
evaluate the effectiveness of approaches
based on the above-mentioned motives for
knowledge diffusion: altruism or intrinsic mo-
tivation, social recognition, and private
rewards. We ask whether social recognition
and private rewards for diffusion affect DFs’
effort to learn about the benefits of the new
technology and subsequently diffuse informa-
tion. Second, we probe whether the impact of
social recognition and private reward incen-
tives varies with DFs’ pro-social preferences.
We measure social preferences of DFs with
an auxiliary lab-in-the-field game––an aug-
mented dictator game with a local charity as
the receiver.
We designed a field experiment in northern
Uganda with two treatment arms and an
“information only” arm: (a) a basic (status
quo) arm where DFs receive training about
specific climate smart agricultural technolo-
gies (i.e., the information-only arm); (b) an-
other arm where they receive the same
1 For related evidence in another context, namely the diffu-
sion of financial knowledge, refer to Sseruyange and Bulte
(2018).
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training plus a private reward (a weighing
scale) in the event of a sufficient increase in
knowledge among other farmers (to be speci-
fied below); and (c) a final arm that combines
the training with social recognition in the
case of a sufficient increase in knowledge
among other farmers. Specifically, in the case
a threshold level was reached, a public cere-
mony was organized in which the DF’s contri-
bution was highlighted and a weighing scale
was given “to the community.” We consider
the information-only arm as the control
group, even though it is not a pure control,
and results should be interpreted accordingly.
As dependent variables we use experimenta-
tion with the new technologies by the DFs
and other farmers, effort devoted by DFs to-
wards training other farmers, and the knowl-
edge gained by other farmers. Our main
results are that (a) incentivizing DFs by pro-
viding them with social recognition has a sig-
nificant and large effect on diffusion effort
and levels of knowledge diffusion; (b) the
effects of providing a private material reward
are small; and (c) the effect of both types of
incentives is not mediated by pro-social pref-
erences (see also Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack
2014).
Our results speak to several bodies of liter-
ature. First, and as mentioned above, it
relates to the rapidly growing literature on
social learning.2 Learning from others facili-
tates aggregation of dispersed information
(Acemoglu et al. 2011; Alatas et al. 2016) and
can generate social multiplier effects in diffu-
sion of innovations (Hogset and Barrett
2010). Social learning can, therefore, contrib-
ute to increased agricultural productivity
(Vasilaky 2012; Vasilaky and Leonard 2018).
Second, we contribute to the literature on
incentives for pro-social behavior or contri-
butions to the common good.3 This literature
has benefitted from recent insights in the field
of behavioral economics, highlighting the po-
tential interaction between motives (e.g.,
Benabou and Tirole 2006; Ariely Bracha, and
Meier 2009; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel
2011). For example, the provision of private
rewards for pro-social behavior may crowd
out altruism or social recognition motives by
obscuring the (self-)signal that someone is
doing “good”—instead of simply doing
“well”. Diffusion of agricultural knowledge is
a pro-social task; the direct benefits created
by the task are enjoyed by those other than
the person who expends the effort (Ashraf,
Bandiera, and Jack 2014). Our inclusion of a
social recognition incentive and analysis of
the role of altruism further differentiates the
current paper from that of BenYishay and
Mobarak (2018), who focus on the effect of
private reward incentives. To our knowledge,
we provide the first evidence about the
effects of social recognition on the diffusion
of agricultural knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. The next
section describes the agricultural context, ex-
perimental design, and data. The subsequent
section discusses the empirical estimation,
followed by a section that presents the find-
ings. The final section concludes.
Context, Experimental Design, and Data
The experiment was implemented in Nwoya
district, northern Uganda, a predominantly
agrarian region characterized by low agricul-
tural productivity. The region’s poverty level
is the highest in the country—about 44% of
the population lives on less than one U.S. dol-
lar per day (Republic of Uganda 2015). The
region is expected to suffer more frequently
from weather shocks in the future, including
prolonged dry spells and uncertainty about
the onset and cessation of rainfall
(Mwongera et al. 2014). Damages to agricul-
tural output due to weather shocks amounted
to more than $900 million in 2010, or 77% of
total damages across all sectors of the coun-
try’s economy (Republic of Uganda 2012,
2016). Diversification to non-farm activities
in rural parts of northern Uganda remains
minimal due to limited employment opportu-
nities outside agriculture.
Efforts to sustain agricultural production in
the region have focused on promoting the
adoption of climate smart agricultural (CSA)
technologies. The government of Uganda has
identified CSA as an effective means of
addressing challenges related to weather
shocks. However, farmers lack knowledge
2 Examples include Munshi (2004), Bandiera and Rasul
(2006), Conley and Udry (2010), Maertens and Barrett (2012),
Krishnan and Patnam (2013), Genius et al. (2013), Magnan et al.
(2015), Beaman et al. (2018), and BenYishay and Mobarak
(2018),
3 Examples include Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Carpenter
and Myers (2010), Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2011), Duflo,
Hanna, and Ryan (2012), Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010),
Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2014), Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee
(2014), Barile, Cullis, and Jones (2015), and DellaVigna and
Pope (2016).
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about CSA technologies and perceive this as
a major constraint to widespread adoption
(Shikuku et al. 2015). Current efforts to re-
structure the extension system recognize the
importance of working with DFs at the
sub-county and village levels to enhance dis-
semination of improved technologies
(Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry
and Fisheries 2016; MAAIF). Our study is
part of this effort, and we focus on the perfor-
mance of DFs that are more or less represen-
tative of the target population.
Sampling and Intervention
We first generated a list of 310 sub-villages in
Nwoya district, from which we randomly se-
lected 132 sub-villages for our study.4 A cen-
sus of all households and household heads
was compiled for these selected sub-villages,
and we randomly sampled 10 households
from each sub-village. We then randomly
picked one potential DF from this sub-
sample and organized a meeting with
co-villagers to discuss whether the selected
candidate was “not too different” (especially
in terms of wealth and landholdings, and edu-
cation) from the rest of the village, and po-
tentially interested to experiment with new
technologies. We did not collect data on indi-
vidual characteristics during the meeting. In
more than 75% of the cases, the first candi-
date was selected as a DF. In the other vil-
lages, we randomly picked another candidate
and repeated the process. In one village we
had to go through three iterations until we se-
lected a candidate that was endorsed by the
co-villagers.
Selected DFs were trained and had to de-
cide whether or not to experiment with the
new CSA technologies on their own farms.
Importantly, the new technologies were not
subsidized or “offered for free” to encourage
farmers to try them out. Instead, farmers had
to decide whether or not to purchase certain
inputs from local agro-dealers, and whether
or not to allocate labor (effort) to the con-
struction of structures recommended during
the training.5 They also had to decide about
the level of effort devoted to the diffusion of
information. The main technologies, de-
scribed below, were new and unfamiliar to
the farmers, so DFs had to spend time
explaining their implementation and
potential benefits.
The 132 sub-villages were randomly
assigned to one of three experimental arms
of 44 sub-villages each: (a) training only,
(b) training plus a private material reward,
and (c) training plus social recognition.
Disseminating farmers in the first experimen-
tal arm (control group) received training
about drought-tolerant maize varieties and
conservation farming basins and were subse-
quently asked to share the information with
their co-villagers. Disseminating farmers in
the second experimental arm received the
same training, but after the training were in-
formed they could earn a private reward.
They were promised a weighing scale if they
managed to share sufficient knowledge with
their peers—to be established during a sur-
prise visit at some unknown date in the fu-
ture. They would earn the weighing scale in
case the knowledge score of one randomly-
sampled co-villager exceeded a threshold.
These farmers were told the reward was pri-
vate, that the weighing scale was theirs to
keep, and that they were free to decide how
to use it. Disseminating farmers in the third
experimental arm also received the training,
and were informed their community would
receive a weighing scale if they managed to
share sufficient knowledge with their peers—
to be evaluated the same way as in the previ-
ous treatment arm. We announced that, in
the case of sufficient knowledge diffusion,
there would be a public celebration during
which the “good performance” of the DF was
publicly announced and the weighing scale
would be handed over to the village chief.
We do not have information on what the
DFs told other farmers about the potential
rewards. We therefore acknowledge that in
both the social recognition and the private re-
ward treatment, it is possible that DFs told
other farmers about the potential for getting
access to a scale. If so, both the social recog-
nition and private reward treatments may
have also had an incentivizing effect on other
farmers (in addition to the DF).
The decision to use the training-only
group as a comparison group instead of in-
cluding a fourth arm (pure control) was made
to increase statistical power, especially be-
cause the randomization was done at the sub-
village level and not the individual level. Our
4 A sub-village is equivalent to a hamlet, and is the lowest ad-
ministrative unit in Uganda. The 132 sub-villages in our sample
are located within four sub-counties.
5 We verified that inputs that had to be purchased were actu-
ally available in local agro-dealers. This was invariably the case.
Shikuku et al. Incentives and Diffusion of Agricultural Knowledge 1167
experiment, therefore, provided training to
all DFs, but varied the incentive received to
disseminate knowledge. The comparison be-
tween either incentive treatment and the
information-only group is more relevant than
the comparison between either treatment and
a pure control because it isolates the effect of
incentives.6
Observe that DFs were not informed about
the (private or social) reward until after com-
pleting the training. This design, therefore,
deviates from BenYishay and Mobarak
(2018), who informed their subjects about the
potential reward before the training.
Informing DFs after the training rules out the
potential impact of incentives on two interme-
diate outcomes. First, incentives may change
the composition of the group of DFs who at-
tend the complete training. Incentives may po-
tentially stimulate invitees with low intrinsic
motivation to attend (see Finan, Olken, and
Pande (2017), on financial incentives and re-
cruitment of public sector workers). Second,
for a given pool of participating DFs, the
incentives may affect their level of learning ef-
fort and hence the knowledge they accumulate
during the training (Sseruyange and Bulte
2018). Since we are primarily interested in the
effect of incentives on DFs’ knowledge diffu-
sion efforts (and not selection effects or learn-
ing effort), we opted for a design in which
the type of DF and his or her knowledge
accumulation during the training is orthogonal
to treatment status, that is, by informing DFs
of their potential rewards after the training.
Our approach, however, implies that we po-
tentially underestimate the full effect of incen-
tives, so that our estimate is a lower bound of
the full treatment effect of incentives on diffu-
sion effort (that is, attendance and effort
during training and effort during follow-up
activities).
Interventions were rolled out in March
2016. We partnered with researchers from the
National Agricultural Research Organization
(NARO) and Tillers International—an NGO
working with NARO to promote conservation
farming in Uganda. We provided a three-day
training session to the selected DFs, which
lasted five hours per training day. In addition
to learning about the benefits and cultivation
of drought-tolerant (DT) maize (Longe 10H),
selected farmers learned how to construct so-
called conservation farming (CF) basins, and
how to sow seeds of the improved varieties in
these basins. Basins retain soil moisture,
improve water infiltration (reducing surface
water run-off) and minimize soil distur-
bance—similar to the “pit planting” technol-
ogy studied in Malawi by BenYishay and
Mobarak (2018). Experimental evidence sug-
gests the existence of yield gains associated
with this technology (Otim et al. 2015; see also
Haggblade and Tembo 2003; Gatere et al.
2013). The training also included crop man-
agement practices such as correct spacing, row
planting, and timely weeding. While the tech-
nology requires an upfront labor investment,
the labor burden decreases in subsequent peri-
ods as the constructed basins are “permanent”
(Haggblade and Tembo 2003).
The trainings were organized in central loca-
tions, and DFs were invited to travel to these
sites. Training sessions were organized per sub-
county, with 11 farmers per session. In each
sub-county, DFs from different treatment arms
were trained in separate venues to minimize
contamination. The cost of transport to the
training venue and back was refunded (USD 4,
on average) and tea and lunch were provided
during the training. Of the 132 farmers that we
invited, 126 attended the full training.
Data and Summary Statistics
The data we use were collected during two
household survey waves. We conducted a de-
tailed baseline survey between September and
December 2015. During this time, we visited
132 sub-villages and in every village surveyed
the DFs, as well as nine randomly selected co-
villagers. In total we visited 1,320 households,
and collected information on household dem-
ographics, crop and livestock production, off-
farm income, assets ownership, exposure to
weather shocks, sources of agricultural infor-
mation and knowledge about farming practi-
ces, social networks, and food security. The
“random villager” that was later used to evalu-
ate the extent of knowledge diffusion was ran-
domly drawn from this sub-sample (enabling
us to control for ex ante knowledge levels in
regression models to increase precision of
our estimates), but this was not communi-
cated to DFs. It is possible that DFs suspected
that we would interview the same co-villagers
visited at baseline, so they might target diffu-
sion efforts towards these individuals. If so,
6 Our design is not suitable to assess the impact of knowledge
provision on diffusion, or the synergies between incentives and
knowledge provision, relative to a pure control group.
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this may bias our estimates of treatment
effects on knowledge diffusion.7
Table 1 presents summary statistics of
baseline data per treatment group, including
demographic information, social network
variables, exposure to weather shocks, and
sources of agricultural information.
Differences across the three groups are small
in magnitude. Using a regression of pre-
treatment covariates on treatment dummies,
an F-test that all treatment arm coefficients
equal zero failed to reject. In addition, we
perform an F-test of joint orthogonality using
a multinomial logit, which tests whether the
observable characteristics in table 1 are
jointly unrelated to treatment status. We can-
not reject this null hypothesis (p-value ¼
0.227), suggesting that the randomization suc-
ceeded in achieving balance across the exper-
imental arms.
Most sample households are male-headed
with an average age of 43 and six years of
completed formal education. The average
size of a household is six with a dependency
ratio of 54%. Ownership of both agricultural
and livestock assets is very low. On average,
a household has two people from whom it
seeks agricultural advice and two relatives in
the village. More than 90% of the sample
households reported to have experienced
drought. Access to government extension is
very low: only 2% of the sample respondents
had received agricultural advice from govern-
ment extension.
The second survey wave was conducted in
September 2016, after the first post-
experimental cropping season, to measure
performance of the DFs. We visited 246
farmers: 123 DFs (of the initial sample of 132
selected DFs, six did not attend their training
and three were not available for interview at
the time of the survey) and a random sub-
sample of 123 “other farmers” (sampled from
the original list of farmers at baseline).8 We
measured three types of dependent variables:
knowledge levels (of the DFs and their co-
villagers), on-farm experimentation (by the
DFs and their co-villagers) and diffusion ef-
fort by the DFs.
To gauge knowledge levels we adminis-
tered a simple test focusing on the content of
the CSA training. Such exams are an effec-
tive approach of assessing knowledge reten-
tion by subjects (Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu
2015), picking up effort during the training as
well as effort to memorize the training con-
tent afterwards. We weigh correct answers by
the inverse probability of a correct response
so that difficult questions carry more weight
in the final outcome (see online supple-
mentary appendix B for the questions).
Knowledge scores for DFs ranged between 0
and 33.0, with a mean of 20.0 (the mean
knowledge score for “other villagers” was
only 13.2).
To measure on-farm experimentation with
the new technologies, we verified whether the
DF and the co-villager had planted the DT
maize variety (Longe 10H), and had con-
structed the CF basins on at least one house-
hold plot. We also measured uptake of other
Longe maize varieties, also discussed during
the trainings and more familiar to the farmers
in our sample. About 8.3% of the DFs had
tried out the Longe 10 H maize variety, and
22% had constructed CF basins. In addition,
about one-third had planted another Longe
maize variety. Not surprisingly, experimenta-
tion by co-villagers was much lower: about
2% tried out Longe 10 H maize, another 2%
tried out CF basins, and 6.5% grew a differ-
ent Longe maize variety.
To measure diffusion effort by DFs we use
a binary outcome capturing whether the DF
organized at least one activity in the sub-
village intended to train co-villagers.
Specifically, we asked the other farmer
whether he or she knew of (or had attended)
any agricultural technology training orga-
nized by another farmer in their sub-village
during the previous season. If they answered
affirmatively, we asked the name of the
farmer who had organized the activity. We
also asked about the content of the activity.
On average, 18% of the other farmers indi-
cated the DF from their sub-village had orga-
nized at least one meeting to train
co-villagers. It is also possible that DFs com-
municated with their neighbors via word of
mouth. To capture this, we include an addi-
tional effort variable measuring the number
of people with whom the DF communicated
about improved farming methods (based on
7 This would be especially problematic if DFs were informed
about the time of the evaluation visit or the content of the knowl-
edge exam. However, DFs neither knew the date of the visit nor
details of the knowledge exam.
8 The selected disseminating farmers who did not attend the
training were spread across the three experimental arms. Of the
three DFs who were not available for interviews during data col-
lection, one had gotten a temporary job at an electricity dam con-
structed by the government, another had migrated to a
neighboring Gulu town, and the third had been hospitalized.
These three DFs were also from three different treatment arms.
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survey data provided by co-villagers, not the
DFs).
Finally, we organized an artefactual field ex-
periment to measure altruism. As mentioned,
intrinsic motivation may interact with extrin-
sic and reputation motives. Following Ashraf,
Bandiera, and Jack (2014), we implemented a
dictator game to elicit an incentive-
compatible measure of pro-social motives.
Each disseminating farmer received 5,000
Ugandan shillings, of which a fraction could
be donated to a charity organization helping
farmers to increase agricultural productivity
and improve their lives.9,10 We interpret the
amount donated as a proxy for the DF’s







Panel A: Baseline individual and household characteristics
Household head is male 0.820 0.791 0.817
(0.384) (0.407) (0.387)
Age of household head (years) 44.084 44.548 42.778
(16.080) (15.644) (14.216)
Household head’s number of years of formal education 6.336 6.032 5.808
(3.336) (4.167) (4.022)
Number of resident household members 5.603 5.870 5.841
(2.317) (2.576) (2.331)
Dependency ratio 0.551 0.539 0.545
(0.233) (0.226) (0.211)
The main activity of household head is farming 0.881 0.926 0.904
(0.324) (0.262) (0.295)
Per capita household income 564,217 519,178 579,632
(752,677) (782,057) (871,267)
Household dietary diversity score 6.813 6.608 6.679
(1.522) (1.554) (1.553)
Agricultural assets index 0.064 0.010 0.063
(4.200) (4.513) (4.326)
Livestock ownership (tropical livestock units) 0.779 0.661 0.640
1.953) (1.328) (1.251)
Access to credit (1¼yes; 0¼no) 0.647 0.638 0.719
(0.478) (0.481) (0.450)
Median social distance in education in the sub-village 2.938 3.269 3.409
(1.272) (1.307) (1.382)
Median social distance in wealth index in the sub-village 3.023 3.052 3.377
(0.908) (0.952) (0.991)
Panel B: Baseline social networks
Number of agricultural information network links 2.018 1.907 1.857
(1.009) (1.066) (1.445)




Panel C: Baseline exposure to weather shocks
Household has experienced droughts 0.956 0.944 0.953
(0.206) (0.230) (0.212)
Panel D: Baseline sources of information
Government extension 0.028 0.023 0.023
(0.165) (0.151) (0.151)
Number of sub-villages (total ¼ 132) 44 44 44
Number of observations 428 431 427
p-value for joint orthogonality test 0.227
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The p-value for the joint orthogonality test is obtained from a multinomial logit regression of the treatment
arms on the variables with robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level.
9 The exact script used in the adapted dictator game is avail-
able in online supplementary appendix C.
10 USD 1 ¼ UGX 3,000 during the time of our experiment.
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intrinsic motivation for the cause (see also
Carpenter and Myers 2010). The average do-
nation was UGX 1,900, with a median of
UGX 2,000 (figure 1 shows the distribution of
donation amounts). We assume that pro-so-
cial preferences are exogenous and do not
vary with exposure to the training or experi-
ment. A formal test (see online supplemen-
tary table A1) was performed to check
whether the experiment affected the outcome
of the pro-social preferences game. We can-
not reject the null hypothesis that treatment
did not affect the outcome of the games.
Empirical Estimation
We first examine the effect of incentives on
the main outcomes of interest, using the fol-
lowing equation:
ð1Þ yivc ¼ a þ b1privateivc þ b2socialivc
þ ciWivc þ nc þ eivc
where yivc represents the outcome of interest
for farmer i in sub-village v and sub-county c:
the above-mentioned measures of knowledge,
experimentation, or diffusion effort. The varia-
bles privateivc and socialivc denote the two treat-
ment dummies, private material reward and
social recognition, respectively, with the
training-only group as comparison group. Next,
Wivc is a vector of individual characteristics,
and nc captures sub-county fixed effects. We
use OLS to explain variation in knowledge (by
DFs and other farmers), and use a probit model
to analyze the DF’s and other farmer’s on-farm
experimentation. For DF’s training effort, we
use a probit model for the dummy effort vari-
able and OLS for the number of people with
whom the DF communicated. Throughout we
cluster standard errors at the sub-village level.
The coefficients b1 and b2 in equation (1)
measure the causal effect of the incentive
treatments on knowledge scores, experimen-
tation and effort, under the identifying as-
sumption that privateivc and socialivc are
orthogonal to eivc. Random assignment to
treatment implies the identifying assumption
is satisfied, unless there are substantial spill-
over effects (so that the SUTVA is violated).
This might happen if DFs in the training-only
group changed their behavior as a result of
knowing that others had been offered
rewards. Two design features were employed
to minimize this risk: (a) we selected only one
DF from each sub-village and hence there
was only one treatment per sub-village; and
(b) DFs attended the training with others
who were assigned to the same experimental
arm (even if this was not announced to the
DFs before the training).11 Training sessions
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Figure 1. Distribution of the amount of money donated by disseminating farmers in the aug-
mented dictator game
11 Only one of our DFs migrated after the training, and none
moved to another sub-village with a different treatment.
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at different venues. Furthermore, sub-villages
in northern Uganda, and Nwoya district spe-
cifically, are geographically dispersed. Still,
we use Global Positioning System (GPS)
coordinates of the sub-villages to test for evi-
dence of spillovers across neighboring sub-
villages. Online supplementary figure A1
(top panel) graphically shows the random as-
signment of treatments, whereas the lower
panel shows sub-villages receiving different
treatments but neighboring each other. Using
a border-to-treatment dummy variable, a t-
test indicates that control group DF effort
was not significantly affected by the presence
of a neighbor from another experimental arm
(see online supplementary table A2).
Note that because we lack follow-up data
in the villages where DFs did not attend
training, our estimates are not intent-to-
treat (ITT) effects. They should be close to
the true ITT effects, however, since only six
farmers dropped out and these were spread
across the three experimental groups.
Indeed, results from estimating Lee’s lower
bounds (Lee 2005) are very similar to the
results we report below (see online supple-
mentary table A3).12
Finally, we assess heterogeneity in the
treatment effect of incentives. To evaluate
the mediating effect of altruism on DFs’ dif-
fusion effort, we use donations in the dictator
game to construct a dummy variable equal to
one if the DF donated above the median
amount, and zero if otherwise. The pro-social
variable p is interacted with the treatment
dummies and included in the DF effort
equation:
ð2Þ effortivc ¼ a þ #1privateivc þ #2socialivc
þ r1privateivcpi
þ r2socialivcpi þ kpi
þ qWivc þ nc þ 1ivc:
Results and Discussion
This section presents the results of our empir-
ical analysis. The section begins with findings
about the effect of incentives on DFs’ experi-
mentation with the technologies, knowledge,
and effort to train co-villagers. It then pro-
ceeds to present results of incentives on the
knowledge of co-villagers and their adoption
behavior. Finally, results of heterogeneous
effects of incentive types by pro-social prefer-
ences and social distance are presented and
discussed.
Incentives and DFs’ Experimentation,
Knowledge, and Diffusion Effort
Table 2 presents results of a series of OLS
and probit regressions assessing the effect of
incentives on DFs’ experimentation with the
technologies (columns 1–3), their retained
knowledge six months after the training
(column 4), and their diffusion effort
(columns 5–6).
Considering on-farm experimentation with
the new technologies, we find that the social
recognition treatment increases the propen-
sity to experiment with DT maize (column
1)—compared to the mean (0.025) for control
group farmers, DFs incentivized with social
recognition are 14 percentage points more
likely to experiment with DT maize on their
own farm. The impact of the private material
reward is null. Disseminating farmers in this
group are as likely as un-incentivized DFs to
grow DT maize.
Social recognition also increases the likeli-
hood of using improved maize varieties
(other than DT maize, column 2) and CF
basins (column 3). On average, the probabil-
ity of growing improved maize varieties
increases by 17 percentage points more for
the social recognition reward arm relative to
the mean (0.150) for the control group.
Similarly, social recognition increases the
probability of using CF basins by around
15 percentage points as compared to the com-
parison group (mean ¼ 0.125). For these ex-
perimentation outcomes there are no
differences between the private material re-
ward and social recognition treatment, but
again we observe that the effect of the private
material reward incentive does not signifi-
cantly differ from zero either.
Results in column 4 show that the incentive
treatments did not affect DFs’ level of knowl-
edge. Remember that DFs were informed
about the treatments after they completed
their training, ruling out any impact on their
knowledge accumulation during training.
These results further indicate that knowledge
12 It is important to mention that the problem we are dealing
with here is non-compliance. Lack of data about the drop outs
means that we are unable to estimate real ITT or LATE (using a
random assignment as an instrument for treatment). Fortunately,
the number of dropouts is very small: 6 out of 132 farmers. Lee’s
“lower bounds” for the impact (Lee 2005) were estimated by ex-
cluding the “worst realization” from the control group and the
best ones from the “social recognition group”.
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levels did not change differentially during the
subsequent six months. The training included
a practical session where, for example, spac-
ing, number of seeds to sow in a hole, and
length, width, and height of the CF basins
was demonstrated in the field. The knowl-
edge questions in the test focused on this sort
of information, not on the practical knowl-
edge that farmers acquire through on-farm
experimentation. Hence, it is not surprising
that test scores did not vary across treatment
arms (i.e., did not improve with own on-farm
experimentation).
Column 5 shows that both incentive types
increase the probability that a DF organized
an activity to train other farmers, compared
to the training-only group. Both types of
incentives are effective in stimulating DFs’
diffusion activity. Specifically, DFs incentiv-
ized by a private material reward are 21
percentage points more likely than un-
incentivized DFs to train other farmers, and
DFs incentivized by social recognition are 24
percentage points more likely to train other
farmers. These outcomes are statistically
identical. Observe that the size of the treat-
ment effect, relative to the mean experimen-
tation or effort level of the control group
(0.075) is large. We find similar evidence for
the effect of the incentives on the number of
people a DF communicated with about im-
proved farming methods (column 6).
Specifically, the DF’s out degree—the num-
ber of people to whom information was com-
municated—increased by 0.9 more in the
social recognition treatment arm and 0.7
more in the private material arm, compared
to the control group (mean ¼ 1.225).
These findings support and extend insights
of BenYishay and Mobarak (2018).
Disseminating farmers respond strongly to
incentives for diffusion. The findings are also
consistent with Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee
(2014), as well as Carpenter and Myers
(2010), who found that social recognition
incentives may be as effective as private ma-
terial rewards for promoting pro-social be-
havior. If anything, we find that social
recognition may matter even more than pri-
vate material rewards.
Results of the effect of incentives on the
knowledge of “other farmers” and experi-
mentation with the technologies are pre-
sented in table 3. Compared to respondents
from training-only sub-villages, knowledge
scores (column 1) increased by 0.42 standard
deviations in the social recognition treatment
arm (significant at the 10% level) and by a
statistically insignificant 0.27 standard
deviations in the private material reward
Table 2. Incentives and Disseminating Farmers’ Knowledge, On-farm Experimentation, and
Diffusion Effort







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Training plus private
reward (PR)
0.025 0.153 0.133 0.118 0.209** 0.689**
(0.073) (0.097) (0.085) (0.231) (0.089) (0.282)
Training plus social
recognition (SR)
0.136** 0.171* 0.147* 0.064 0.244*** 0.908***
(0.057) (0.096) (0.082) (0.231) (0.083) (0.300)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.340 0.168 0.158 0.037 0.139 0.169
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123
Mean of dependent variable
for non-incentivized DFs
0.025 0.150 0.125 0.054 0.075 1.225
[0.158] [0.362] [0.335] [1.071] [0.267] [1.050]
PR ¼ SR (p-value) 0.067 0.836 0.857 0.814 0.674 0.513
Note: DF means disseminating farmer. Dependent variables are as follows: columns (1), (2), and (3) are dummy variables equal to one if the disseminating
farmer (DF) tried out the technology on at least one of the household’s plots, and zero otherwise; column (4) is the standardized knowledge score of the DF;
column (5) is a dummy equal to one if the DF held at least one meeting or activity to train other farmers, and zero otherwise; column (6) measures the num-
ber of people in the sub-village with whom the DF communicated about improved farming methods. Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level
clustering are reported in parentheses. Square parentheses are the standard deviations of the control group means. Asterisks indicate the following: ***¼
p< 0.01, **¼ p< 0.05, and *¼ p< 0.1. Household controls include household head being male, age, education, and main economic activity of the household
head, dependency ratio, livestock ownership, agricultural assets ownership, and access to credit. Columns (4) and (6) are OLS estimates. Columns (1), (2),
(3), and (5) report average marginal effects from probit regression. DT maize means drought-tolerant maize; CF basin means conservation farming basin.
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arm. We acknowledge that DFs in both treat-
ment arms could try to “incentivize” their co-
villagers by promising access to the weighing
scale after the experiment, and that this is
likely to be stronger in the social recognition
arm. The estimates therefore pick up the in-
centive effect for the DF as well as (any) in-
centive effect for co-villagers, and the latter
may contribute to the difference between pri-
vate reward and social recognition effects.13
The effects of both treatments on “other
farmers’ experimentation” are smaller, as
expected, and only marginally significant in
the social recognition arm and for improved
varieties of maize generally (column 3).
While we are able to pick up as small as 0.2
SD effect sizes, the effects are smaller than
that. We find no significant effects on DT
maize (column 2) and CF basin (column 4).
Compared to the actual adoption by neigh-
bors, DF effort and knowledge as well as
other farmers’ knowledge are more proxi-
mate outcomes with less confounding factors.
Hence, one is more likely to see impact for
these variables than for actual adoption.14
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of
Incentives
It is plausible that not all DFs are equally re-
sponsive to incentives. For example, in their
Table 3. Incentives and Other Farmers’ Knowledge and On-farm Experimentation
Incentive type Other Farmers’
Knowledge
On-farm Experimentation
DT Maize Improved Maize CF Basin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Training plus private reward (PR) 0.267 0.033 0.031 0.045
(0.210) (0.030) (0.043) (0.032)
Training plus social recognition (SR) 0.413* 0.052 0.102* 0.046
(0.232) (0.033) (0.055) (0.033)
Baseline knowledge score 0.030 - - -
(0.037)
Household controls Yes No No No
Sub-county fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.100 0.065 0.040 0.043
Observations 123 123 123 123
Mean of dependent variable for other
farmers in sub-villages where DFs
were not incentivized
0.211 0.000 0.025 0.050
[0.729] [0.000] [0.158] [0.221]
PR ¼ SR (p-value) 0.529 0.617 0.236 0.908
Note: DF means disseminating farmer. Dependent variables are as follows: column (1) is standardized knowledge scores of the other farmer (not DF); col-
umns (2), (3), and (4) are dummy variables equal to one if another farmer (not the DF) tried out the technology on at least one of the household’s plots, and
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering are reported in parentheses. Square parentheses are the standard deviations
of the control group means. Asterisks indicate the following: ***¼ p< 0.01, ** ¼ p< 0.05, * ¼ p< 0.1. Linear probability model (LPM) estimates for column
(1) and average marginal effects from probit regression for columns (2–4). DT means drought-tolerant variety of maize (Longe 10H); CF basin means conser-
vation farming basin.
13 We went back to the field in May, 2018 to collect additional
data on how the weighing scales were being used (we held per-
sonal interviews with the DFs in the private reward arm, and
with village leaders in the social recognition arm). We found that
in both groups, the weighing scales still existed and were in work-
ing condition. In the private arm, the DFs mostly used the weigh-
ing scales for weighing their own produce (mainly maize), rarely
allowing others to access it—in very few cases, access was
allowed to close relatives and neighbors. Whereas relatives did
not pay, neighbors were typically charged a small fee for using
the scale. In the social recognition arm, we found that the village
chiefs were still in charge of keeping and maintaining the weigh-
ing scales—ruling out the possibility that the weighing scale
ended up with the DFs. Second, co-villagers were allowed to ac-
cess the weighing scale at no fee, but with strict instructions to
handle the scale with care. Finally, we found there were a few
other individuals—in both the private and social recognition
arms—who owned weighing scales. For these privately-owned
weighing scales, access by co-villagers was limited.
14 Ex-post power calculation assuming a 5% level of signifi-
cance, 0.8 (80%) power, and a sample size of 246 revealed that
the minimum detectable effect for DF experimentation with DT
maize (private¼0.057; social recognition¼0.099), CF basins
(private¼0.141; social recognition¼0.143), likelihood to train
others (private¼0.124; social recognition¼0.126), information ex-
change (private¼0.286; social recognition¼0.287), and co-villager
knowledge (private¼0.307; social recognition¼0.305). are in
most cases smaller than the ones picked up in this study, and in
all cases smaller for social recognition. However, for other farm-
ers’ actual experimentation with DT maize, we are able to pick
up effects as small as 0.040 and 0.054 for private and social recog-
nition larger than the actual effects that we actually estimate.
Similarly, the minimum detectable effects for other farmers’ ex-
perimentation with improved maize (private¼0.069; social recog-
nition¼0.091) and CF basins (private¼0.056; social
recognition¼0.056) are generally larger than the actual effects
that we actually estimate.
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study of promoting health-related pro-social
behavior, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2014)
found that the effects of private material
rewards and social recognition are stronger
for intrinsically altruistic subjects. We now
analyze whether this result extends to the do-
main of agricultural knowledge diffusion. We
first ask whether the impact of incentives on
the propensity to invest effort in knowledge
diffusion is mediated by pro-social preferen-
ces, and whether external incentives may
“crowd out” altruism—as sometimes pro-
posed in the literature. Specifically, if altru-
ism leverages the impact of incentives then
we expect the interaction of our altruism vari-
able and the incentive (treatment) dummies
to enter with a positive sign and significantly.
Instead, if incentives crowd out altruism, then
we expect that the altruism variable enters
with a positive sign (level effect), but that the
interaction between altruism and incentive
dummies enters with negative signs.
Results are reported in table 4, where we
use a dummy variable equal to one if the DF
donated above the median amount of money,
and zero if otherwise, as a proxy for pro-
social preferences or altruism. We find that
the interaction between pro-social preferen-
ces and incentives––consider the terms PR 
pro-social and SR  pro-social––is not
significant at the 10% level for DF’s experi-
mentation with the technologies (columns 3–
5) and the knowledge of other farmers (col-
umn 6). Looking at effort expended by DFs
to hold activities and train other farmers, the
interaction between pro-social preferences
and incentives is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level (column 1). However,
we also find a significant and negative level ef-
fect of pro-social preferences (column 1).
More altruistic farmers spend, on average,
less effort organizing training activities. The
interaction terms and level effect are statisti-
cally of the same magnitude, but have oppo-
site signs, meaning that the positive effect of
the interaction terms is cancelled out by the
negative effect of the level pro-social vari-
able. The effect of incentives on DF’s effort
and actual experimentation with the technol-
ogies does not, therefore, seem to be medi-
ated by pro-social preferences.15 The effect













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private reward (PR) 0.184** 0.754** 0.020 0.182 0.097 0.340
(0.091) (0.317) (0.050) (0.112) (0.097) (0.252)
Social recognition (SR) 0.188** 0.794** 0.156* 0.255** 0.090 0.277
(0.087) (0.340) (0.084) (0.108) (0.093) (0.241)
Pro-social 0.938*** 0.677* 0.074 0.182 0.013 0.039
(0.161) (0.382) (0.050) (0.162) (0.147) (0.228)
PR  pro-social 0.900*** 0.117 0.040 0.124 0.150 0.311
(0.220) (0.714) (0.073) (0.230) (0.196) (0.417)
SR  pro-social 1.010*** 0.268 0.034 0.317 0.170 0.471
(0.209) (0.620) (0.129) (0.206) (0.184) (0.498)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.156 0.220 0.178 0.184 0.163 0.136
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123
p-value (PR  pro-social)
¼ (SR  pro-social)
0.565 0.629 0.967 0.352 0.188 0.169
Note: Average marginal effects. The variable Pro-social is a dummy variable equal to one if the DF’s donation in the dictator game was above the median do-
nation. Controls include household head is male, age, education, and main economic activity of the household head, dependency ratio, livestock ownership,
agricultural assets ownership, and access to credit. Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering (123) reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate the following: ***¼ p< 0.01, **¼ p< 0.05, *¼ p< 0.1. DT means drought-tolerant variety of maize (Longe 10H); CF basin means conservation farm-
ing basin.
15 Lack of a differential effect should be regarded with caution
as it is possible that the study did not have enough power to pick
such effects. Ex-post power analysis indicates that except for the
likelihood of a DF to train co-villagers, the study is under-powered
for the rest of the outcomes. The minimum detectable effects
results are as follows: likelihood to train co-villagers (private*pro-
social¼0.286; social recognition*pro-social¼0.340); information ex-
change (private*pro-social¼1.225; social recognition*pro-
social¼1.163); DT maize (private*pro-social¼0.104; social
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of the interaction terms on the number of
people that the DF informed about the tech-
nologies is also not statistically significant at
tje 10% level (column 2).
First, consider the negative effect of altru-
ism: in the absence of incentives, why are
more altruistic DFs less likely to invest effort
in training their peers? This finding is consis-
tent with our understanding of heterogeneity
in farm productivity and the low quality of
agricultural inputs in Africa. We speculate
that altruistic farmers who lack confidence in
the profitability of new technologies for their
co-villagers should not diffuse information.
Such a lack of confidence in overall profitabil-
ity may follow from three reasons. (a)
Heterogeneity in production conditions imply
that the same technology will not be profit-
able for all farmers—even within the same
village (Suri 2011)—this is especially likely
for labor-intensive (or costly) innovations
such as the construction of CF basins; (b)
drought-tolerant seeds might not have a yield
advantage over other improved varieties, or
might even have a yield penalty in normal
years (Holden and Fisher 2015); (c) there
exists a major problem of counterfeit inputs
in northern Uganda. In a recent study, Bold
et al. (2017) find that 30% of nutrients are
missing in chemical fertilizer, and samples of
hybrid maize were estimated to contain less
than 50% of improved seeds (presumably
due to extensive adulteration). These authors
find that, on average, low quality inputs result
in near zero average rates of return in
Uganda.
In light of these observations it seems rea-
sonable for DFs to question whether adopt-
ing these innovations is actually welfare-
improving for all co-villagers. Instead, it may
be optimal to delay transmission of the rele-
vant information until after additional infor-
mation has become available. Such a
cautionary response can, however, be over-
whelmed by incentives. If DFs are incentiv-
ized to diffuse information they choose not to
delay transmission, and behave like their
non-altruistic peers. In an effort to gain the
material reward or social recognition, they
seem willing to take the risk of spreading in-
formation that is potentially not useful to
their peers. Extrinsic and intrinsic motives
therefore work in opposite directions if the
net benefits of new technologies are uncer-
tain, and can offset each other.
The finding of a positive effect of pro-
social preferences on the number of people
that the DF talked with about the technolo-
gies perhaps suggests that while altruistic
DFs may be reluctant to demonstrate the use
of new technologies to their peers, they may
consider it harmless to make them aware of
such technologies. Altruistic DFs may also
talk to their peers about the new technologies
because they enjoy interacting with them, or
to “send a signal” that they are not withhold-
ing information that could potentially be rele-
vant for them. The interaction terms are,
however, not statistically different from zero.
Finally, we examine heterogeneous treat-
ment effects on DF effort (whether they or-
ganized an activity and the number of people
communicated with) by social distance.
Motivated by the selection criteria for the
DFs, we consider two social distance varia-
bles, namely wealth status and education.
The social distance variables are measured
based on baseline data as follows. First, we
construct dyadic pairs for each of the
respondents in a sub-village who were inter-
viewed at baseline. Next, for each dyadic
pair, we compute the absolute difference in
wealth status (household assets index) and
education. We then calculate the median dis-
tance for each sub-village and variable, and
observe how close or far the absolute dis-
tance between the DFs and their neighbors is
from the median distance in the sub-village.
This allows us to capture heterogeneity in dis-
tance in the sub-village: in other words, we
control for the possibility that in a sub-
village, a wide social distance between the
DF and the neighbor might simply reflect an
existing wide median distance in the sub-
village.
Results show that treatment effects do not
vary with social distance in terms of wealth
status, as interaction terms of both treatments
with social distance are insignificant (table 5,
columns 1 and 3). In terms of distance in edu-
cation, we find that greater distance increases
the effect of the private reward incentive on
the probability of DFs organizing a training
activity (table 5, column 2), but has no inter-
action with treatment effects on the other ef-
fort variable (columns 3 and 4). Overall,
recognition*pro-social¼0.274); improved maize (private*pro-
social¼0.257; social recognition*pro-social¼0.338); CF basin (pri-
vate*pro-social¼0.408; social recognition*pro-social¼0.397);
knowledge of co-villagers (private*pro-social¼0.644; social recog-
nition*pro-social¼1.092).
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therefore, we find no evidence that the effect
of incentives increases with smaller social dis-
tance between DFs and their co-villagers.
Conclusion
Effective approaches to alleviate poverty in
sub-Saharan Africa will require agricultural
intensification, but a key concern is how to
promote the adoption of modern production
techniques that are more productive and re-
silient. Conventional extension efforts have
by and large failed to reach large swaths of
the rural population, and the search is on for
innovative approaches to stimulate the diffu-
sion of information about agricultural innova-
tions. Social learning has long since been an
important component of such efforts, but it is
increasingly clear that diffusion of informa-
tion within social networks may neither be
easy nor “automatic.” In contexts where indi-
vidual farmers stand to gain little from
spreading information but expect to pay a
positive (effort) cost, diffusion is often slow
and imperfect. Incentivizing farmers to en-
gage in diffusion represents one potential
solution.
In this paper we use an experimental ap-
proach to study the effects of incentivizing
farmers to allocate effort to the diffusion of
information. Incentivizing can happen in dif-
ferent forms, and we consider two types of
“extrinsic rewards” for effective information
sharing: a private material reward for the dis-
seminating farmer (DF), and an intervention
that aims to build the reputation of the DF
within his or her community (“social recog-
nition”). As a material reward we used a
weighing scale, and we focus on the diffusion
of knowledge about climate-smart agricul-
tural practices. We find that reputation build-
ing may be a particularly effective way to
promote diffusion—while a private material
reward had small effects on diffusion, the
same reward given to “the community” in a
public ceremony celebrating the efforts of the
Table 5. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Social Distance
Organized Activity Information Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private reward (PR) 0.200 0.076 1.149*** 0.157
(0.125) (0.131) (0.434) (0.524)
Social recognition (SR) 0.215* 0.183* 0.960** 0.982*
(0.110) (0.108) (0.421) (0.506)
DistHHassets index 0.019 0.011
(0.022) (0.087)
PR  DistHHassets index 0.002 0.174
(0.036) (0.133)




PR  DistHHHeduc 0.063* 0.199
(0.037) (0.165)
SR  DistHHHeduc 0.039 0.013
(0.027) (0.102)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.146 0.155 0.192 0.210
Observations 123 123 123 123
p-value (PR  social distance) ¼
(SR  social distance)
0.911 0.488 0.363 0.258
Note: Average marginal effects. Dependent variable for column (1) and (2) is a dummy equal to one if the disseminating farmer (DF) held at least one meet-
ing or activity to train other farmers, and zero otherwise, whereas in columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable measures the number of people in the sub-
village with whom the DF communicated about improved farming methods DistHHassets index and DistHHHeduc measure social distance in terms of house-
hold assets (wealth status) and education, respectively. Household controls include household head being male, age, education, and main economic activity
of the household head, dependency ratio, livestock ownership, agricultural assets ownership, and access to credit. Robust standard errors corrected for sub-
village level clustering (123) reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate the following: ***¼ p< 0.01, **¼ p< 0.05, *¼ p< 0.1.
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DF effectively pushed up DFs’ own experi-
mentation, diffusion effort, and actual infor-
mation transmission. We believe this result
speaks to the importance of social recogni-
tion or status for rural livelihoods in Africa.
A large body of literature studies the inter-
action between different motives for pro-
social behavior, and in particular asks
whether extrinsic motives (private rewards or
“reputation building”) may interact with in-
trinsic motives. Indeed, in theory it would be
possible that providing extrinsic rewards
reduces the diffusion of information if the
“crowding out effect” is sufficiently large and
dominates the direct incentive effect.
However, our data are not consistent with
such outcomes.
We hope the results in this paper can guide
thinking about effective ways to promote the
diffusion of information. The main policy
message is that including incentives in exten-
sion schemes may be welfare-enhancing.
However, this begs the question about scal-
ability—can extension approaches based on
incentives be scaled across larger landscapes,
and how can first-order beneficiaries in turn
be incentivized to reach out to second-order
beneficiaries, and so on? Additional
experimentation with innovative approaches
is presumably necessary for this. An auxiliary
policy message concerns the perceived low
quality of agricultural inputs. Bold et al.
(2017) correctly identify that poor handling
and adulteration reduce the rate of return of
adopting these inputs. Our results suggest
that low input quality may also attenuate
incentives to share information in social net-
works. Addressing the issue of low-quality
inputs may therefore have beneficial effects
along multiple dimensions.
Two caveats to our experimental design
and results are noteworthy. First, as men-
tioned earlier, while excluding a pure control
group was necessary in order to increase sta-
tistical power, the pitfall is that our estimates
do not capture the full impacts of training
with private material rewards and training
with social recognition on experimentation
and diffusion effort. Second, we did not in-
form DFs about the nature of their potential
reward until the end of the training. Doing so
could have affected effort during the training
(as documented by BenYishay and Mobarak
2018 and Sseruyange and Bulte 2018).
Because of this reason, our approach implies
we potentially underestimate the true effect
of the incentives.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary materials are available at
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
online.
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